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ABSTRACT 
Conventional wisdom contends that fiscal policy was of secondary importance to the 
economic recovery in the 1930s. The recovery is then connected to monetary policy that 
allowed non-sterilized gold inflows to increase the money supply. Often, this is shown by 
measuring the fiscal multipliers, and demonstrating that they were relatively small.  
This paper shows that problems with the conventional measures of fiscal 
multipliers in the 1930s may have created an incorrect consensus on the irrelevance of 
fiscal policy. The rehabilitation of fiscal policy is seen as a necessary step in the 
reinterpretation of the positive role of New Deal policies for the recovery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The established conventional wisdom on the causes of the Great Depression emphasizes 
the role of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies implemented as a result of the Gold 
Standard (Eichengreen 1992).  In particular, it is argued that monetary contraction 
(Friedman & Schwartz 1963) and banking panic (Bernanke 1983) in the United States 
were the initial shocks that caused the crisis that was propagated to the rest of the world 
by the international monetary system (Temin 1989). 
Temin (1989) following Kindleberger (1973), suggests that the causes of the 
Depression are more profound. In this view, strong policy action to deal with a major 
international financial crisis is extremely unlikely in the absence of a hegemon—i.e. a 
dominant economic power that has the international reserve currency and can provide 
liquidity and expanding demand in the case of a crisis. World War I, the collapse of 
British hegemonic power, and the unwillingness of the United States to step into the 
hegemonic role vacated by the United Kingdom are the deeper causes of the Great 
Depression. 
If the Gold Standard is central for understanding the causes of the Great 
Depression, then recovery, by the same token, would be associated with the abandonment 
of that particular international monetary arrangement. Eichengreen & Sachs (1985) show 
that the countries that depreciated first were the first to recover, supporting the view that 
the Gold Standard was to blame for the depth of the global slump.
1 
Friedman & Schwartz (1963), on the other hand, argue that the increase in money 
supply from 1933 onwards spearheaded the recovery. Romer (1992) suggests that 
monetary policy indeed was central for the recovery, more so than fiscal policy and that 
the main cause of the monetary expansion was the gold inflows associated with the 
European political instability.
2 Fiscal policy and the employment creation policies of the 
New Deal are, in this approach, of secondary importance.
3 
                                                 
1  Diaz Alejandro (1984) provides similar evidence for Latin American countries. 
2  Similar argument is put forward by Meltzer (2003). 
3  The classic paper by E. Cary Brown (1956) is the seminal work that suggests that fiscal policy was 
insufficient during the 1930s to get the economy out of the prolonged slump.   4
This paper analyzes the evidence presented by Romer (1992) on the role of fiscal 
policy. The paper suggests that the role of fiscal policy has been misrepresented in the 
conventional literature, and that in fact fiscal policy was central for the recovery. The 
next section discusses the problems with the conventional interpretation and the role of 
monetary policy during the recovery. The following section describes the limitations of 
Romer’s approach to the analysis of fiscal policy, while the subsequent presents an 
alternative interpretation of the recovery in which fiscal policy is shown to have a 
prominent role. The last section presents some concluding remarks on the current re-
interpretations of the New Deal. 
 
PUSHING ON A STRING DOESN'T DO IT FOR ME 
 
Conventional interpretations of the causes of the Great Depression and the subsequent 
recovery tend to emphasize monetary factors, in particular, those associated with the 
functioning of the international monetary system. The limitations of the inter-war Gold 
Standard are central for the conventional wisdom on the depression. These views are 
fundamentally based on a variation of Hume’s price-specie flow mechanism, according to 
which flows of gold, and their effects on prices would lead to a smooth adjustment of the 
balance of payments (Eichengreen 1996).
4 
In this view, the gold standard failed because of lack of credibility, partly caused 
by the political pressures associated with the rise of the masses, and their political role in 
undermining the government’s commitment to price stability. Hence, gold outflows 
generated the deflationary pressures, and caused the fall in the level of output and 
employment. 
However, gold stocks are correlated with domestic money supply measures, and 
with the level of activity, falling mildly in the beginning of the depression—with a few 
fluctuations in 1930 and 1931, following international events, including Britain’s move 
off gold in September of the latter year—and a significant increase after 1934, even after 
                                                 
4  Eichengreen (1996, p. 25) argues, in fact, that Hume’s theory “remains the dominant approach to 
thinking about the gold standard today.” In fact, a modern version based on the incorporation of rational 
expectations, and time inconsistency can be seen as a modern version of the specie flow model (Bordo and 
Kydland 1996).   5
the depreciation of the dollar in April 1933. However, the correlation between gold, 
output and prices is weak, and as noted by Meltzer (2003, p. 275), the gold standard had 
not prevented anti-cyclical policies in the 1923-24 and 1926-27 recessions. In other 
words, the Fed would have had space to expand the money supply and avoid the 
contraction that led to deflation and the depression, even within the rules of the Gold 
Standard system. The policies of the Fed, rather than the Gold Standard, in the monetarist 
view are to blame for the Great Depression.
5 
This is why Meltzer (2003) characterizes monetary policy as a failure in the 1929-
33 recession, and as taking the back seat rather than the steering wheel in the 1933-37 
recovery, even though monetary policy is seen as central for the recovery. The money 
supply, in monetarist fashion, led the recovery, but the Fed was a passive observer of the 
outflows and inflows of specie. 
Meltzer’s argument is that the severity of the monetary contraction was, to a great 
extent, the result of adherence by monetary authorities to the real bills doctrine, and not 
simply a result of the gold standard rules. Like Friedman & Schwartz (1963), Meltzer 
argues that it was the failure of the monetary authorities that caused the depression. 
In both views, either the conventional view that attributes the monetary 
contraction to the Gold Standard (e.g. Eichengreen 1992) and the monetarist view (e.g. 
Meltzer, 2003) the causality goes from money to prices and output. The monetary 
contraction would have not caused the recession if prices adjusted quickly enough, but 
the nominal rigidities imply the need for quantity adjustments as well. The nominal 
rigidity argument is the reason why these are sometimes seen as Keynesian 
                                                 
5  From a theoretical point of view, Meltzer (2003, p. 63) distinguishes between what he refers to as the 
Ricardian tradition, associated also with the Bullionists and the Currency School, that believed in a strict 
correlation between gold and prices, with the works of Thornton, Fisher, and  Keynes of the Treatise on 
Money (Wicksell is surprisingly excluded), that allowed for output variations and lagged effects on prices. 
He dismisses the defenders of the Real Bills Doctrine, in which he includes Steuart but not Smith, and the 
Banking School, and presumably the modern defenders of endogenous money (which are not cited) as 
lacking a coherent analytical framework.  For Meltzer the Banking School argument boils down simply to a 
belief that monetary policy is impossible or inefficient.  For that reason, perhaps, Meltzer (2003, p. 21) 
tends to believe that the distinctions between monetary schools “suggest more direct confrontation of ideas 
than appears to have taken place.”  In fact, at the heart of the Bullionist/Anti-Bullionist, Currency/Banking 
school debates there is a central methodological issue, that is, the causality between money, prices, and 
output.   6
interpretations of the depression.
6 In both views, monetary policy is sufficient for 
bringing the system back to equilibrium, and a moderate amount of fiscal policy is only 
necessary as a result of the short-term rigidities. 
Once the money or banking rate of interest is aligned with the natural rate of 
interest, the system would return to full employment.
7 The problem with the conventional 
interpretation is that it is not sufficient to dismiss the alternative approach, which 
suggests reverse causality between money, prices, and output.  In this view, a collapse of 
spending (e.g. consumption), caused in part by the collapse of a bubble (i.e. asset price 
deflation) would reduce the level of economic activity, and the demand for money.  A 
central bank that followed the Real Bills Doctrine as the Fed did would reduce the money 
supply, but would not be responsible for the collapse in output or the deflation, even if it 
were responsible for preventing the bubble in the first place.
8  In other words, money 
supply increase is neither sufficient nor necessary for economic recovery. 
This is not to say that the money supply is unrelated to the recovery. The identity 
of exchange implies that by definition the uses of money match the nominal value of 
output. As a result, it is always possible that a recovery would depend on an increasing 
velocity of circulation of money, and actual recoveries tend to rely both on increasing 
money supply and increased velocity of circulation. But recoveries also rely on the 
expansion of spending (in general a combination of private and public spending), low 
rates of interest, the expansion of credit and, in the case of the Great Depression, a more 
depreciated exchange rate. One may conclude that an increase in money supply is an 
insufficient but non-redundant part of the unnecessary but sufficient conditions for 
                                                 
6  Meltzer (2003, p. 55) is, for example, critical of the rational expectations school for assuming that the 
price level responds to money instantaneously. 
7  The only additional problem would be the zero bound limit to the nominal rate of interest, and the lack of 
understanding by the monetary authorities of the distinction between real and nominal variables, something 
emphasized by Meltzer (2003, p. 53), since in this case deflation would imply high real rates even if the 
nominal rates of interest are low. This lack of understanding is only a problem if the monetary authority can 
actually produce inflation by increasing the money supply, something that is taken for granted by Meltzer, 
a view also assumed by Christiano et al. (2003). 
8  Note that in this approach there is no need for nominal rigidities to cause the recession, a view more akin 
to that of Keynes in the General Theory, who believed that price flexibility would make things worse rather 
than better (Amadeo 1989).   7
recovery.
9 In other words, the increase in money supply is only one of the several 
elements needed for economic recovery. 
It is possible, in this context, that the recovery and the increase in money supply 
are the effects of a third causal force. The post-Keynesian view of the recovery would, in 
fact, emphasize the role of spending, and the endogenous nature of money supply. In this 
view, faced with a contracting economy and deflation, monetary policy can only reduce 
the nominal rate of interest to its lower bound, and expect that it would stimulate 
spending. The famous phrase, incorrectly attributed to, but popularized by Marriner 
Eccles, the Fed’s chairman in that period, that monetary policy in a depression was like 
"pushing on a string" fits this view on the causality between monetary and real 
variables.
10 
Also, it is important to note that a central aspect of the monetary policy of a 
central bank that follows the Real Bills Doctrine is to function as the fiscal agent of the 
State. The central bank not only provides the money supply according to the needs of 
trade, but also guarantees the credit of the central government, maintaining relatively low 
rates of interest on government debt. In other words, not only the short-term rate of 
interest is kept low, but also the long-term rate. In order to maintain this policy, the Fed 
has to buy government bonds whenever the private demand is not sufficiently large, this 
is also known as quantitative easing. 
After the 1929 crisis the amount of government securities rose from less than 10 
percent of total assets held by the Fed to more than 30 percent, and as the economy 
recovered the volume fell to almost the initial levels, only to take off during World War 
II.  The objective of quantitative easing was to maintain the rate of interest on 
government bonds below 2.5 percent, an objective that was acknowledged by the Fed 
authorities, and that was fundamentally achieved (Vernengo 2009).
11 
In that sense, the notion was that, since the Fed could not by itself get the 
economy out of the recession, it could help the Treasury to promote a fiscal expansion in 
a sustainable way.  The great failure of monetary policy in this view during the 1930s 
                                                 
9  The concept of insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition or INUS 
was developed by John Mackie, and used to analyze economic causality by Hammond (1986) and (1996). 
10  For a history of the origins of the phrase see Vernengo 2009, p. 86. 
11  This is in contradiction with the modern understanding of quantitative easing as an instrument to simply 
increase money supply.   8
was not the monetary contraction, but the inability to curtail bank failures (Bernanke 
1983).
12 
Central banks have significant power to act as lenders of last resort, and they can 
actually avoid widespread systemic failures of the banking system.  However, their 
ability to control inflation, either directly through the control of the money supply, or 
indirectly by managing the rate of interest, has been greatly exaggerated by conventional 
wisdom. 
 
FISCAL POLICY, YOU SHOULD TRY IT 
 
The conventional theoretical macroeconomic framework, as we noted before, provides 
limited scope for fiscal policy as an anti-cyclical policy instrument, even if the empirical 
literature does show that fiscal policy is effective, particularly when the rate of interest is 
low (Christiano et al. 2009; Woodford 2011).
13 This theoretical policy stance carries on 
to the empirical analysis of fiscal policy during the depression. Romer (1992) is the 
canonical view on the effects of macroeconomic policy during the Depression, and 
provides a simple formula to assess the relative influence of monetary and fiscal policies 
on the level of activity. According to Romer, the changes in output can be decomposed as 
follows: 
 
















Romer (1992) infers the values of α and α2 by assuming that the decline in output in 
1921 and 1938 were fully caused by monetary and fiscal policy, and that the residual 
term would be zero.   The differences in the size of the coefficients are related to the 
                                                 
12  Another mistake that could be added is the hiking of the discount rate in 1931, after the depreciation of 
the pound, to avoid gold outflows. The same cannot be said of the decision to raise reserves before 1937-38 
recession. As shown by Stauffer (2010) banks were able to expand credit after the increase in reserves and 
before the recession by switching from government securities to loans. The existence of excess reserves 
meant that banks were not constrained. 
13 In fact, by the 1990s self-styled Keynesians, such as Brad De Long (1998, p. 73) could argue that “the 
pre-depression fears that fiscal policy multipliers could be zero or negative were real fears.”   9
different method of estimation, to the different period, and to the fact that changes are not 
measured with respect to a normal period (in Romer’s analysis the average level of the 
variables between 1923 and 1927).
14  It is clear that with an increase in federal 
government spending from around 5 percent in the pre-depression period to close to 10 
percent in the post-depression era, and Romer’s fiscal multiplier of -.233, fiscal policy 
would be insufficient to bring the economy back from the brink of disaster. Also, state 
and local governments maintained surpluses during the period reducing the effectiveness 
of the federal fiscal stimulus. 
However, the authors believe that these results and any results derived from this 
equation, including Romer’s results, are flawed, since there are some important 
limitations in Romer’s approach which may significantly alter the conclusions of what 
really brought about the recovery. The decomposition in equation (1) seems to be derived 
from two different identities. The first, based on the equation of exchange, says that the 
amount of money in circulation must be sufficient for allowing all the transactions 
associated with the production of output in a given year to take place. 
Thus, there is a relation between output and money supply, and causality may go 
both ways, as noted in the previous section. The second identity comes from the National 
Accounts, and implies that output is decomposed into its expenditure components. From 
that relation a fiscal policy multiplier can be derived, presuming causality in Keynesian 
fashion from expenditure to income. Taxes are not usually part of the autonomous 
component, as in Romer’s decomposition, and are incorporated in the multiplier itself. 
In the monetarist tradition an increase in money supply would lead to an increase 
in the level of output.
15  However, in the Keynesian story, money affects output indirectly 
through its effects on spending. In particular, as noted by Romer (1992, pp. 775-81) in 
her discussion of the transmission mechanism, it is the changes in the rate of interest that 
are essential to understanding the effects of money on income. In her specification, 
                                                 
14  The idea of using a normal period is important to provide a measure of money supply and of the fiscal 
deficit that is adjusted to the changes in the economy, in other words, measures of the monetary and fiscal 
stance that would be independent of the cycle, sometimes incorrectly referred to as the full employment 
balance because neoclassical economics assumes that the normal condition is one with full utilization of 
resources.  Then, changes from the norm would be considered to be anti-cyclical policies. 
15  However, when Friedman (1970) presented his model it was fundamentally an ISLM model with an 
augmented expectations Phillips curve. In other words, the effects of monetary policy were also 
intermediated by the effects of money supply on the rate of interest.   10
however, Romer seems to believe that money affects output directly, without mediation, 
as in Friedman’s proverbial helicopter that throws excess money that consumers can use 
to spend. She deals in a separate set of regressions with the role of monetary policy on the 
rate of interest and the latter on spending. She finds that the conventional Keynesian story 
holds; however, it must be noted that the issue of causality here also becomes important. 
Romer’s calculations presume that money supply caused changes in the rate of 
interest and these, in turn, led to an increase in investment and consumption. Yet again 
the causal relations may very well be more complex than is assumed by conventional 
wisdom. Money supply is only one of the influences on the rate of interest. Two other 
important variables that affect the rate of interest are the discount rate, a policy variable 
determined by the Fed, and open market operations, including quantitative easing, i.e., 
not just the change in the composition of the Fed’s balance sheet, but also a change in its 
size. In other words, it is far from clear that monetary policy should be seen as 
fundamentally associated with the control of the money supply in that particular period. 
Also, it is presumed that the lower rates of interest caused spending. The 
correlation between investment and interest rates is normally weak, but in this case it 
goes at least in the right direction. It must be noted, however, that spending falls in the 
periods of deflation, when the real rate of interest increases, even though the nominal rate 
remains constant and close to zero. It may very well be the case that the deflationary 
forces that reduce real wages and farmer’s incomes, with the fall in agricultural prices, 
and lead to decreased demand also determine the increase in the real rate of interest.
16 
Hence, Romer’s decomposition presented in equation (1) tends to confound the effects of 
money on income. It would be more reasonable to either provide a separate measure of 
the money multiplier, in which case the question of causality might be brought up, and of 
the spending multiplier. If one believes that the money supply is endogenous, then the 
more reasonable way to assess the effect of monetary policy would be by measuring the 
effects of the reduction of the rate of interest on spending. 
In that respect, the direct impact of gold inflows, which are deemed central for the 
recovery in the conventional view of the Depression, on the rate of interest, seems to be 
                                                 
16  Note that empirical analysis of the causality between investment and output suggests that it is the latter 
that determines the former, as in the accelerator.  See Blomström et al.1996.   11
nil. The same can be said about the broader definition of money supply. The nominal 
interest rate falls from the beginning of the Depression and remains low throughout the 
whole period, while money supply falls up to 1933 and then grows continually all 
through the recovery. 
The reduction in the rate of interest might have significant effects on the level of 
activity for different reasons. For example, the Fed was adamant that by maintaining a 
low rate of interest on government securities, fiscal deficits could be expanded on a 
sustainable basis. Hence, the importance of fiscal policy in combination with a monetary 
policy that facilitated fiscal expansion would be behind the expansion in spending. 
Aside from the conceptual issues in Romer’s multipliers that come from equation 
(1), there are also issues involved in the actual calculation of the multipliers. Romer’s 
calculation, although innovative and worthy of notice, does not however produce 
consistent sensible multipliers. Because the calculations are so dependent on the 
magnitude and sign of the variables, other time periods produce completely different and 
often nonsensical multipliers. For instance, using the years 1923 and 1941 instead of 
1921 and 1939 produces a fiscal multiplier of .25 (which has the wrong sign) and a 
monetary multiplier of .59. For the years 1926 and 1944, the fiscal multiplier is -.0177 
and the money multiplier is .0176, far below what any historical estimate would be for 
each individual multiplier. Much of the problem may have to do with the lack of 
quarterly data available for the 1920’s through WWII. Romer uses the years 1921 and 
1938 because “in both cases there were large movements in real output that have been 
almost universally ascribed to monetary and fiscal policy decision” (Romer 1992, pg. 
736).  In other words, these multipliers are “narrow” multipliers that only represent these 
years and the information embodied in the data for these years. These calculations do not 
represent “broad” multipliers or the impact of government spending and monetary policy 
during the entire depression period through the war. 
We can proceed then to look at the effects of the spending multiplier, independent 
of the monetary variables, assuming that investment is derived demand, according to 
what Hicks referred to as the supermultiplier (Bortis 1997).  A simple measure of the 
supermultiplier would provide a quantitative estimate of the direct impact of the   12
government and the external sector, the two main elements of autonomous spending, in 
the recovery.  The supermultiplier can be represented in log-linear terms as: 
 
(2)    ∆Yt =α1∆Gt +α2∆Xt +εt 
 
In this case, α represents the supermultiplier, and the level of activity is determined by 
autonomous spending, i.e., government spending and foreign demand. Table 1 shows the 
results of the simple estimation, for two different specifications. 
 
Table 1 Fiscal and Foreign Multiplier (1929-1945) 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
Fiscal  .4181306  7.06  .2767662  2.90 
Foreign  .382905  4.93  .2912528  2.12 
 
The first model is a linear regression using the logarithm of differenced GDP as the 
dependent variable and the log of differenced government spending and differenced 
exports as the independent variables, respectively.
17  Both exports and government 
spending are assumed to be exogenous, which provided a clean fiscal multiplier
18. 
Exports are largely exogenous because the demand for US goods is tied to international 
demand for products. Using the time period 1929 through 1945, the results show a 
coefficient of .4181306, which corresponds to a government spending multiplier of 1.69.   
Using a similar regression and adding a lagged term to the government spending variable 
as well as exports to reflect the time it takes for the multiplier effect to kick in gives a 
slightly lower coefficient of .2767662, implying a slightly smaller fiscal multiplier of 
1.38.
19  Note that the foreign trade multiplier is very similar to the fiscal multipliers (the 
                                                 
17  All regressions are log-linear, which means that we estimate elasticities rather than super-multipliers.  
For simplicity we will refer to them as multipliers, even though the presumption is that investment is 
derived demand. 
18 The potential for government spending to be endogenous is addressed in our Structural VAR model later 
in the paper. 
19 Optimal lag tests were performed using AIC criterion and results varied between 0 lags and 1 lags.  The 
authors believe that if quarterly data were available a more optimal lag time could be found.  Because the 
data only comes in yearly format for this time period, results for both 0 lags and 1 lag are shown.   13
implied multiplier in model 1 is 1.62 and the implied multiplier for model 2 is 1.41), but 
the growth in exports during the Depression era would not be sufficient to promote an 
export-led recovery. 
Changing the time period from 1929-1945 to 1933 to 1945 in order to capture the 
New Deal and the War period fiscal policies was also tested. The regression results are 
listed in table 2. The coefficient is .3902 in this case, implying a multiplier of 1.64, which 
is significantly different than the one we found by using Romer’s (1992) specification. 
 
Table 2 Fiscal and Foreign Multiplier (1933-1945) 
Model 1(no lags)  Model 2(lagged 
independent 
variables) 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
Fiscal  .3902853  5.75  .1686379  1.89 
Foreign  .3334126  4.93  .0960555  .71 
 
In order to capture the endogeneity that exists between government spending and 
GDP, a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model was used to measure the fiscal 
and foreign trade multiplier. The identification strategy is to use the recursive approach 
recommended by Sims (1980).
20 A triangular decomposition is used, assuming that 1) 
Exports are not affected by GDP or Government spending; 2) GDP is affected by both 
Government spending and exports; and 3) government spending is affected by GDP.  
This allows us to impose constraints on the matrices in the SVAR in a simplistic fashion.   
The ordering of the variables follows a simple narrative approach and lists them from 
their most exogenous (exports) to the most endogenous (GDP), with government 
spending listed second.
21 The multiplier will be calculated using the elasticity reported 
from the Cholesky decomposition between the relevant variables. Optimal lag length was 
determined using the AIC criterion, and as expected because of the yearly data format, 
results indicated a lag of one year. The results of the Cholesky decomposition are listed in 
table 3, and estimate the SVAR for the period 1929 to 1945 and imply a government 
multiplier of 1.0544, and an export multiplier of 1.1502.  Of all the estimations 
                                                 
20 By imposing (n
2-n)/2 restrictions in the structural model, the model becomes exactly identified (Enders, 
2004). 
21 See Gordon and Krenn (2010).   14
performed, this fiscal multiplier is the lowest. It is however, larger than Romer’s 
estimation.     
 
Table 3:   SVAR (1929-1945) 
  Foreign  Fiscal  Output 
Foreign  .13064042  0  0 
Fiscal  -.11485823  .13236396  0 
Output  .00918903  .05163345  .024828 
 
Another set of models were used to calculate the fiscal multiplier, this time 
avoiding the endogeneity problem completely by using defense spending in place of 
government spending.  Defense spending avoids the endogeneity problem because it is 
completely autonomous from GDP.  The time period 1929 to 1945 was used for the 
standard OLS regression, and the results appear in table 4.  The defense-spending 
coefficient is .132218 without including lagged independent variables, and .1174 with 
lags.  This corresponds to a multiplier of 1.1523, and 1.1330 respectively. The implied 
multipliers for the model with lagged independent variables are similar, for defense 
spending 1.13, and for exports 1.20.  In particular, this suggests that different types of 
spending might have different multiplier effects. 
 
Table 4 Defense Spending and Foreign Multiplier (1929-1945) 
Model 1 (no lags)  Model 2 (lagged 
independent 
variables) 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
Defense  .132218  3.36  .1174665  3.02 
Foreign  .1767485  1.66  .172572  1.47 
 
Extending the use of defense spending as an exogenous variable, a basic Instrumental 
Variable (2SLS) approach was used was used to calculate the fiscal multiplier, using 
defense spending as an instrumental variable for government spending (see Almunia et 
al. 2010). This allows us to adjust for the potential endogeneity between government   15
spending and GDP.   Defense spending meets the criterion for use as an instrumental 
variable because a) it is highly correlated with government spending, and b)   
uncorrelated with the error term. The results are shown in table 5, and were performed 
with and without lags on the independent variables. The defense-spending multipliers 
related to the coefficient estimates are 1.62 without lags and 1.51 with lags.
22 The export 
multipliers increase to 1.55 and 1.51, respectively.    
 
Table 5 IV approach (2SLS) Fiscal and Foreign Multiplier (1929-1945) 
Model without lags on independent 
variables 
Model with Lags 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient   T-stat 
Defense 
Spending 
.383165  5.92  .339046      3.26     
Foreign  .35532  4.66  .3401905      2.57 
 
Finally, if one estimates the impact of the federal government’s fiscal policy on 
employment, including the job creation programs of the New Deal, those would confirm 
the effectiveness of fiscal expansionism.
23 The problem with the pre-1937-38 recession 
deficits is not that they were involuntary, which is correct, but that they were not 
sufficiently large for the task. Fiscal policy did not fail; it just was not tried in an 
adequate fashion.
24 Once the recession allowed the Keynesians within the administration 
to dominate the policy debate, and the war made the efforts for balancing the budget a 
moot point, fiscal expansion was large enough to bring the economy to full 
employment.
25 
In sum, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it seems that the New Deal and 
World War II, particularly through fiscal policy activism, were central for the recovery. 
                                                 
22  This shows conclusively that military spending is not necessarily a burden on growth (Pivetti 1992). 
23  Our preliminary estimations also show multipliers that are above one. Darby (1976) provides a clear 
account of the effect of the New Deal on employment levels.  Once the workfare programs are accounted 
for, unemployment fell from 25% in 1933 to 9% in 1936, rising to 13% in 1938, before falling to 10% in 
1940 and continuously to 1.2% in 1944.  This can hardly be seen as a failure. 
24  1937-38 marks the watershed between New Deal Mark I dominated by a preoccupation with regulation 
of monopolies and Mark II more concerned with Keynesian anti-cyclical policies. See Sandilands (2001). 
25  Gordon & Krenn (2010) find that for the first quarter of 1939 to the second quarter the fiscal multiplier 
is 1.8, emphasizing also the importance of fiscal policy in the recovery from the Roosevelt recession of 
1937-38.   16
The fiscal multipliers were larger than what is assumed by conventional wisdom, and 
monetary policy was a subsidiary policy needed to sustain the fiscal expansion. 
These results, if anything, underestimate the effects of the New Deal policies, 
which “left in place a set of institutional arrangements that constituted a more coherent 
pattern than is dreamt of in many philosophies,” as one of the classic studies in the 
subject suggested (Kennedy 1999, p. 365). By promoting security for workers with the 
Wagner Act, security in old age with the Social Security Act, access to affordable 
housing, and other reforms that would culminate in the immediate post-war with the 
Employment Act in 1946, the New Deal created an environment that would prevent 
major crises, without the need for fiscal policy fine tuning, since the increased size of the 
State implied significantly larger automatic stabilizers. 
 
NEW DEAL OR NO DEAL 
 
The view according to which fiscal policy was not central for the recovery in the 1930s is 
still dominant among economists, but it was very uncommon until recently to find serious 
historians that would argue that the New Deal was irrelevant or even worse, detrimental 
for the economy, and that it delayed the upturn (e.g. Shlaes 2007; Folsom 2008).   These 
positions, however, have been fueled by the research of New Keynesian authors that 
suggest that “fiscal policy … contributed almost nothing to the recovery before 1942” 
(Romer 1992, p. 781), and by the notion raised “by economists working in the Keynesian 
tradition … that deficit spending is not expansionary” (De Long 1998, p. 72). 
In the extreme, this view led to a complete denial of the relevance of fiscal 
activism.   Again De Long (1998, p. 84), now a defender of fiscal policy to counteract the 
so-called Great Contraction, argued: “do not attempt to aggressively use discretionary 
fiscal policy because the lags make it impossible to do so in an effective manner.” The 
New Deal without fiscal policy activism, which was the result of a hard won intellectual 
battle within the corridors of power, or the successful employment programs, would be 
like Hamlet without the Prince. 
By denying incorrectly the importance of fiscal policy, and incorrectly 
emphasizing the effects of monetary policy, the revisionist view diminishes the   17
accomplishments of the New Deal, and promotes the anti-New Deal agenda of the 
conservative movement. As correctly noted by Hannsgen and Papadimitriou (2009) the 
New Deal revisionism is central to understanding the current ascendancy of fiscal policy 
skepticism. Contrary to De Santayana, in this case those who cannot remember the past 
(or prefer to distort it) are condemned to not repeat it. 
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